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Treaties and the Presumption against Preemption
David H. Moore ∗
INTRODUCTION
When deciding whether a federal statute that regulates domestic
issues preempts state law, “the Supreme Court presumes that
Congress does not intend to displace the traditional regulatory
authority of the States.” 1 The question arises whether this same
presumption applies when the federal law at issue is an Article II
treaty. At this stage, the draft Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States replies that “[t]he case law does
not clearly support any presumption regarding preemption of State
law by a treaty.” 2 This Article attempts to demonstrate that there is
(or should be) more clarity in favor of a presumption against
preemption in the treaty context than the draft Restatement (Fourth)
suggests. Part I summarizes the nature of the presumption against
preemption. Part II identifies which of the three types of treaty—
self-executing, executed, and non-self-executing—may effect
∗ Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Research and Wayne M. and Connie C. Hancock
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School. I wish to thank
participants in the BYU Law Review Symposium on Treaty Law and the Restatement for helpful
comments, and in particular Mike Ramsey, who also reviewed a prior draft of this Article.
1. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
But cf. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 278, 307–09, 331 (2011) (noting inconsistent
invocation of the presumption against preemption); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV.
225, 232 (2000) (arguing that a presumption against preemption is inconsistent with the
original understanding of the Supremacy Clause). The Supreme Court has left unresolved
whether the same presumption “appl[ies] to statutes that concern foreign affairs.”
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). For an
argument that it should not, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption,
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 181–87, 195–201.
2. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015);
see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 892, 969 (2004) (discussing how the Supreme Court over time has invoked inconsistent
“background assumptions about the preemptive force of treaties”).
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preemption. For those treaties that may work preemption, Part III
explores whether the presumption against preemption attaches.
I. DEFINING THE PRESUMPTION
To begin, it is important to understand the nature of the
presumption against preemption. 3 The reach of the presumption is
not entirely clear. Sometimes the presumption is stated broadly: the
presumption is said to apply generally, not just when the state law
that might be preempted falls within an area of traditional state
regulation. 4 Thus, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court asserted that
[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress
has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,’ . . . we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ 5

The narrower version of the presumption focuses on the particular
threat of displacing state authority in areas of traditional state
regulation. 6 The Supreme Court invoked this narrower version in
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner when it stated, “There is . . . a
presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state
regulation such as family law.” 7 While some of the arguments in
favor of the narrower version also support the broader version, the
draft Restatement (Fourth) addresses the narrower version of the
presumption. 8 This Article follows suit.

3. For a quick overview of the history of, and current debates regarding, the
presumption against preemption, see Young, supra note 1, at 265–78, 307–10.
4. Id. at 332–34.
5. 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)).
6. It thus raises the challenges of identifying areas of traditional state regulation and of
deciding the area in which a potentially preemptive federal law operates. See, e.g., Young, supra
note 1, at 435–37.
7. 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001).
8. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015)
(“[T]he Supreme Court presumes that Congress does not intend to displace the traditional
regulatory authority of the States” through “federal statutes that concern domestic matters.”).
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II. WHEN TREATIES MAY PREEMPT
One might read the draft Restatement (Fourth) as suggesting
that even the narrower version of the presumption against
preemption applies less frequently in the treaty context, with the
result that treaties tend to preempt state law more readily than do
statutes. While it may be true that certain types of treaties preempt
more readily than statutes (an issue addressed infra), this is not true
of all treaties. Treaties generally present in one of three forms: 9 (1)
non-self-executing treaty, (2) executed non-self-executing treaty, or
(3) self-executing treaty. 10 If any of these treaties lacks power to
preempt state law, the presumption against preemption would not
apply. Concluding that the presumption does not apply would not
mean that treaties preempt more than statutes, but less. The
presumption would not apply because the treaty could not effect
preemption at all, rather than because the treaty could preempt
unobstructed by the preemption.
To understand the work of the presumption against preemption,
then, we must ask the preliminary question whether treaties of each
type may preempt state law. Self-executing treaties clearly may, as the
draft Restatement (Fourth) recognizes. 11 Asakura v. City of Seattle
provides a familiar example. 12 In Asakura, a local ordinance sought
to prevent a Japanese subject from operating a pawnshop in Seattle
notwithstanding a U.S.-Japan treaty of amity securing the rights of
Japanese subjects to carry on business in the United States on the

9. I classify treaties by wholes for simplicity’s sake. The reality is that self-execution
and implementation are properly determined at the treaty obligation rather than entire treaty
level. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Different obligations within the same treaty may be nonself-executing, non-self-executing but implemented, and self-executing.
10. Although a self-executing treaty might be the subject of facilitating legislation—
legislation that, for example, “detail[s] specific legal procedures, burdens of proof, and
remedies for courts applying” the treaty—the treaty itself would remain directly enforceable in
U.S. courts and should be treated, for preemption purposes, like self-executing treaties that
lack facilitating legislation. John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule,
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 666–67 (2010); see also id. nn.44–45.
11. E.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015) (“[W]hen there is a
conflict between State or local law and a self-executing treaty provision, courts will apply the
treaty provision.”).
12. 265 U.S. 332, 332 (1924).
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same terms as U.S. citizens. 13 Noting that the treaty was selfexecuting—that is, “operate[d] of itself without the aid of any
legislation”—the Court concluded that the offending ordinance
was preempted. 14
Non-self-executing treaties that have been implemented by
statute (i.e., executed treaties) may also effect preemption. Formally,
it is the statute, not the treaty, that preempts, but preemption
effectively enforces the treaty obligations against the preempted
law. 15 Missouri v. Holland provides an example of this scenario. 16 The
United States and Britain entered a treaty to regulate birds that
migrated between the United States and Canada. 17 The treaty
provided that “[t]he High Contracting Powers agree themselves to
take, or propose to their respective appropriate law-making bodies,
the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present
Convention.” 18 A treaty obligation to legislate (or here, to propose
legislation) is likely to be classified by U.S. courts as non-selfexecuting. 19 Congress executed the treaty obligation by passing the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 20 Finding the treaty and statute
constitutional, the Court permitted enforcement of the statute in the
face of contrary state law. 21

13. See id. at 339–40.
14. Id. at 341.
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[S]trictly, it is the implementing legislation,
rather than the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the United States.”).
16. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
17. Id. at 431.
18. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, (Aug. 16, 1916), 39 Stat. 1702; see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
19. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 73, 80
(2d ed. 2003) (asserting “that all treaties are self-executing except those . . . which, by their
terms considered in context, require domestic implementing legislation or seek to declare
war”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES § 108 reporter’s note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). But cf.
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695,
709–10 (1995) (reasoning that a treaty may overcome a presumption of self-execution if it
“stipulate[s] for some future legislative act” while concluding that a treaty that requires only
necessary legislation remains self-executing since the Supremacy Clause renders implementing
legislation generally unnecessary in the United States).
20. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31.
21. See id. at 435.
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As these brief examples illustrate, the preemptive potential of
self-executing and executed treaties is well-established. That is not
the case when it comes to non-self-executing treaties. The
Restatement (Third) speculated that non-self-executing treaties could
preempt state law in certain circumstances. Such a treaty, the
Restatement (Third) reasoned, might evidence a “federal policy
superseding State law or policy.” 22 Similarly, a non-self-executing
treaty might “occupy a field” and thereby preempt even consistent
state law, though that possibility “ha[d] apparently not been
adjudicated.” 23 The draft Restatement (Fourth) currently does not
include this language, nor does it foreclose preemption by non-selfexecuting treaty. 24
Yet recent developments suggest that non-self-executing treaties
cannot, of themselves, effect preemption. In Medellín v. Texas, the
Court faced a U.S. treaty obligation to “undertake[] to comply”
with judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 25 In
response to a suit by Mexico, the ICJ had ordered the United States
to review and reconsider the capital convictions and sentences of
José Medellín and other Mexican nationals. 26 Texas criminal
procedure barred the review. 27 Consequently, there was a direct

22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 1 reporter’s note 5 (“Supremacy implies that
State law and policy must bow . . . when inconsistent with federal law or policy . . . .”).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. § 1 reporter’s note 5 (“There are no clear
cases, but principle would support the view that the federal government can preempt and
exclude the States [—that is, occupy the field—] not only by statute but by treaty or other
international agreement, and even by executive acts that are within the President’s
constitutional authority.”).
24. The draft Restatement (Fourth) explains that self-executing treaties prevail over
contrary state law, but does not expressly address the preemptive potential of non-selfexecuting treaties. R ESTATEMENT (F OURTH ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: T REATIES § 108 (A M. LAW I NST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015); id.
cmts. a–b; see id. reporters’ note 1 (observing that “[c]ourts have frequently found treaty
provisions to supersede contrary State or local law, often without addressing the question
of self-execution”).
25. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1; see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008).
26. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12, 72 (Mar. 31); see also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 502–03.
27. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503–04. Medellín’s initial habeas petition was rejected for
procedural default based on Medellín’s failure to raise his claims earlier; the habeas petition he
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conflict between the United States’ treaty obligations and Texas
law. 28 It would be impossible for Texas courts to both engage in
review and reconsideration and treat Medellín’s request as barred.
The Court resolved this conflict in favor of state law because the
treaty obligation to comply with ICJ judgments was non-selfexecuting. 29 A non-self-executing treaty obligation, at a minimum, is
not enforceable by U.S. courts. 30 Thus, the Court could not engage
in the least aggressive form of implied preemption—conflict
preemption—based on a non-self-executing treaty.
This conclusion does not bode well for the Restatement (Third)’s
suggestion that a non-self-executing treaty might work a more
aggressive preemption, field preemption. Preemption is ultimately a
question of intent. 31 If the Court did not find an intent to preempt
in the narrow space where the federal treaty and state law conflicted,
it is hard to imagine a non-self-executing treaty demonstrating an
intent to occupy a broader sphere. Indeed, congressional intent to
occupy a field is often indicated by congressional establishment of a
detailed regulatory and remedial scheme. 32 Rather than manifest
intent to fill a regulatory and remedial space, a non-self-executing
treaty evidences a decision to forego remedies, at least in U.S.
courts, until the enactment of implementing legislation.
Intent to occupy a field may also arise from lawmaking in an area
of dominant federal interest. 33 In Medellín, there were compelling

filed after the ICJ ruled in Mexico’s favor was barred by Texas law’s prohibition on successive
petitions. See id. at 501–04.
28. See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949–50 (2013) (explaining that “a
[preemptive] conflict occurs when compliance with both federal and state
regulations is impossible”).
29. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–06, 522–23.
30. See, e.g., David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic Status
of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 491 n.46 (2010).
31. See, e.g., Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (repeating the
established principle that “‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every preemption case”) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
32. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (“The intent
to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
33. See Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
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federal interests to support preemption of Texas law. It was
undisputed, the Court acknowledged, “that the Avena decision—a
decision that flows from the treaties through which the United
States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction . . . constitutes
an international law obligation on the part of the United States.”34
Securing federal power to comply with national treaty commitments
was one of the motivations behind creation and ratification of the
Constitution itself and generated provisions such as the Supremacy
Clause. 35 Moreover, the Court recognized that in seeking to comply
with the ICJ’s judgment,
the President [sought] to vindicate United States interests in
ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention,
protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating
commitment to the role of international law. These interests [were]
plainly compelling. 36

Yet none of these interests traversed the non-self-executing nature of
the United States’ treaty commitments to preempt state law.
Medellín thus undercuts the Restatement (Third)’s speculation that
non-self-executing treaties may produce field preemption.
Medellín likewise suggests that federal policies reflected in nonself-executing treaties will not be given preemptive effect. The
notion that federal foreign affairs policies may preempt state law
draws support from American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi. 37 In
that case, the United States and Germany, as well as other countries,
had entered executive agreements to resolve the problem of unpaid
Holocaust-era insurance claims. 38 In its own effort to facilitate the
resolution of those claims, California enacted legislation requiring
insurance companies to divulge information about Holocaust-era
policies. 39 The federal executive complained that California’s
34.
35.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 108 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary
Draft No. 4, 2015) (“Ensuring the capacity of treaty obligations to supplant inconsistent state
laws, particularly in state courts, was a central objective of the Supremacy Clause.”).
36. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524; see also id. at 511 (acknowledging that compliance with
ICJ judgments involves “sensitive foreign policy decisions”).
37. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
38. See id. at 405–08.
39. See id. at 408–10.
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legislation interfered with the federal response to the issue. 40
Although the executive agreements did not expressly displace the
California law, the Court found the law preempted by “the foreign
policy those agreements embody.” 41
Medellín reached the opposite conclusion when the potentially
preemptive federal policy derived from non-self-executing treaties.
The treaties at issue in Medellín could easily be said to reflect a
federal policy of compliance with ICJ judgments. By ratifying the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
the United States agreed to submit itself to ICJ jurisdiction in suits
like Avena. 42 Pursuant to the UN Charter, the United States
“undert[ook] to comply” with the judgment issued in those suits. 43
The United States itself argued that these treaties “create[d] an
obligation to comply.” 44 Moreover, while the U.S. withdrew from
future ICJ jurisdiction in cases like Avena, the President specifically
resolved to comply with the Avena judgment by having state courts
review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of Medellín and
other Mexican nationals. 45 Accordingly, the executive urged
preemption of the obstructing Texas law. 46 Notwithstanding the
policy of compliance arguably reflected in the treaties and expressed
by the President before and during the litigation, the Court upheld
Texas law. The Court seemed to reason that a non-self-executing
treaty reflects an understanding by the treatymakers that preemption
will generally derive from future legislation rather than the treaty or
executive policy. 47 Requiring the preemption decision to be made
through the legislative process would ensure that a single federal

40. See id. at 411.
41. Id. at 417; see id. at 413, 420–27.
42. See Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325; Medellín, 552 U.S. at 499.
43. U.N. Charter art. 94(1); Medellín, 552 U.S. at 500.
44. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (quoting Brief for United States of America as Amicus
Curiae at 11). At the same time, the United States retained authority to veto any efforts to
enforce ICJ judgments at the Security Council. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–11. This fact cut
against classifying the obligation to comply as self-executing, but does not preclude a general
policy of compliance. See id.
45. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503.
46. See, e.g., id. at 523.
47. See id. at 525–30.
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actor could not preempt state law. 48 Consistent with this reasoning,
the Court concluded that the President “may not rely upon a nonself-executing treaty to ‘establish binding rules of decision that
preempt contrary state law.’” 49
The conclusion that the President could not derive authority
from a non-self-executing treaty to preempt state law does not
preclude preemption by the President in all circumstances. Both
majority and dissent recognized that it would be “difficult to believe
that in the exercise of his Article II powers pursuant to a ratified
treaty, the President can never take action that would result in setting
aside state law.” 50 Yet the Court seems to have left little room for this
possibility. The Court applied Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework
to assess the President’s authority to execute a non-self-executing
treaty, concluding that a non-self-executing treaty places the
President in category three where he can only prevail if the power he
exercises is exclusive to the presidency. 51 Such exclusive powers are
limited. They include a (recently endorsed) power to recognize
foreign states and governments. 52 The President might also execute a
treaty when authorized by statute (at least if the statute is enacted
after the treaty). 53 The practical result is that non-self-executing
treaties are likely to give rise to state preemption by presidential
action in relatively few, if any, situations. Moreover, the preemption
would be effected by the President’s independently authorized
implementing action, not the treaty itself, placing these treaties in a
similar category to treaties implemented by statute. The President’s
limited ability to preempt state law in conjunction with a non-self48. See id. at 526–30. The requirement of legislative implementation places the
preemption decision in the hands of Congress and the President rather than the courts. These
lawmakers (President and Congress) include the treatymakers (President and Senate) and are
therefore in a better position than the courts to assess whether state laws impede the treaty’s
purposes and ought to be preempted.
49. Id. at 530 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 5). The Court did
recognize that the President could “comply with [non-self-executing] treaty[] obligations by
some . . . means [other than converting them into judicially enforceable and preemptive law],
so long as [those means] are consistent with the Constitution.” Medellín, 552 U.S. at 530.
50. Id. at 523 n.13 (quoting dissent of Breyer, J., at 564).
51. See id. at 524–25, 527; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 132 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015).
53. Cf. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 529–30 (searching for statutes reflecting congressional
acquiescence in the President’s attempted execution of the ICJ judgment).
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executing treaty only confirms the conclusion that such treaties
cannot effect preemption on their own.
If all this were not enough to conclude that Medellín forecloses
preemption by non-self-executing treaty, the Medellín Court raised
the possibility that a non-self-executing treaty may not even qualify
as domestic law. 54 Such an understanding of non-self-execution
would provide additional reason not to give the treaty preemptive
effect. It would be hard to argue, for example, that the federal
government sought to occupy a legal field or to adopt a preemptive
policy by ratifying a treaty on the understanding that the treaty’s
terms would not even enter domestic law.
The result is that a non-self-executing treaty, without more, does
not present the issue of preemption to the courts. 55 The presumption
against preemption is not relevant, not because the presumption
does not apply to treaties, but because non-self-executing treaties do
not present the possibility of preemption. Medellín endorsed a broad
scope for non-self-execution, thus reducing the number of treaties
that might effect preemption of state law. 56
III. WHEN THE PRESUMPTION ATTACHES
For those treaties that are self-executing post-Medellín, or that
are executed, the question arises whether the presumption against
preemption attaches. As the draft Restatement (Fourth) notes, the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent on this question, often
preempting state law in the face of conflicting treaties but

54. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 30, at 491 n.46 (discussing how Medellín generated
uncertainty over the meaning of non-self-execution). But cf. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2084 (2014) (suggesting that a non-self-executing treaty is domestic law that is not
judicially enforceable until executed by Congress); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
735 (2004) (indicating that a non-self-executing treaty does “not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts”).
55. Similarly, the draft Restatement (Fourth) concludes that “[o]nly self-executing
treaty provisions can be applied by the judiciary to override a federal statute, since non-selfexecuting treaty provisions are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts.” RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 109
reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
56. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 30, at 490–91.
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occasionally endorsing a presumption against preemption. 57 The
Court’s most recent case touching on the question suggests that the
presumption attaches to treaties that have been statutorily executed.
There are good reasons to apply the presumption to self-executing
treaties as well.
A. Executed Treaties
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bond v. United States 58
suggests that the presumption against preemption applies to nonself-executing treaties that have been executed by statute. That is,
the presumption applies even when the statute in question is a
statute implementing a treaty. 59 The treaty at issue in Bond—the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction 60—was non-self-executing. 61 It required “[e]ach State
Party . . . in accordance with its constitutional processes, [to] adopt
the necessary measures to implement its [Convention] obligations,”
including by criminalizing actions that State Parties were prohibited
from taking. 62 Congress executed the treaty by enacting the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, under which
petitioner Carol Bond was prosecuted. 63 The Court turned first to
the treaty to understand the reach of the Act. 64 The Court was
understandably skeptical that the treaty was meant to address Bond’s
relatively minor use of chemicals against her former friend. 65
Nonetheless, “[e]ven if the treaty [did] reach that far,” Congress

57. See, e.g., R ESTATEMENT (F OURTH ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE
UNITED STATES: T REATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM . LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2015).
58. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
59. See William S. Dodge, Bond v. United States and Congress’s Role in Implementing
Treaties, AJIL UNBOUND (June 4, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://www.asil.org/blogs/bond-vunited-states-and-congress%E2%80%99s-role-implementing-treaties (“The central holding of
Bond is that statutes implementing treaties are not exceptions to the rules of statutory
interpretation that the Supreme Court has developed to protect federalism.”).
60. 1974 U.N.T.S. 317, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21.
61. Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (2014).
62. Id. (quoting Convention, Art. VII(1), 1974 U.N.T.S. 331).
63. Id. at 2085.
64. Id. at 2087.
65. See id.
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could “observ[e] the Constitution’s division of responsibility
between [the federal and State] sovereigns,” leaving matters of
traditional state regulation, such as “local crimes[,] to the States.”66
In other words, even if a non-self-executing treaty does not respect
the federalist division of power and attempts to reach areas of
traditional state regulation, Congress will be presumed
to have implemented in a narrower fashion, consistent with
federalism restraints. 67
The federalist presumption Bond applied was not the
presumption against preemption. Bond was not asking whether the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act preempted state
law. Rather, Bond asked whether that Act meant to reach an area of
traditional state regulation—the regulation of local crime. As a
result, the Court applied the “[c]losely related” canon that the
federal government must be reasonably explicit if it wishes to alter
the federal-state balance of power. 68
Notwithstanding this difference, there is reason to believe postBond that the Court would apply the presumption against
preemption to implementing statutes. First, the rationale behind
both presumptions is the same: maintenance of the federalist
allocation of power in the absence of federal decision to alter it. 69
Second, the presumption applied in Bond protected against
comparatively minor intrusion on state authority. It protected against
the extension of federal law into an area of traditional state
regulation in a way that would arguably have complemented state
law. Even if the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act
reached Bond’s crime, state law would continue to do so as well. If
federalism necessarily constrained, by presumption, the reach of a
complementary federal law implementing a treaty, it would
presumably constrain the more intrusive reach of a preemptive
implementing act.
Indeed, the facts in Bond might be perceived as presenting a
preemption scenario, providing additional support for application of
66. Id.
67. But cf. id. at 2090 (noting that consideration of federalism principles is appropriate
in interpreting an ambiguous implementing statute while suggesting that the purpose of the
treaty implemented may remove statutory ambiguity).
68. Id. at 2089.
69. See, e.g., id. at 2088–90.
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a presumption against preemption to implementing legislation. The
federal implementing act in Bond would displace (albeit through
prosecutorial discretion) the lesser penalties state law elected for the
sort of behavior in which Bond engaged. The Court protected state
authority in this scenario by presumption and presumably would do
so in more direct preemption cases as well.
There are two significant counterpoints to this conclusion. First,
Bond’s focus on the reach of the implementing statute resulted from
a desire to avoid reaching broader questions about the limits of the
federal government’s treaty and necessary and proper powers. 70
While three Justices addressed these broader questions, 71 the
majority avoided them by construing the implementing legislation to
not reach Bond’s conduct. 72 Second, Bond is only one case—albeit
the most recent one—in which the Court has touched on the
appropriateness of a presumption against preemption in the treaty
context. As noted, the Court has generally preempted state law
without reference to the presumption. The Court has also expressed
doubt about whether the presumption against preemption applies to
statutes bearing on foreign affairs. 73
If Bond itself does not erase that doubt going forward, the doubt
has sufficient outlet in the presumption against preemption. As
noted, the narrower version of the presumption is tied to whether
the state law that is at risk of preemption resides in an area of
traditional state regulation. A general concern that state law should
not occupy certain areas—such as human rights policy toward
Burma—can find full expression in the presumption. At the same
time, it is important that the presumption’s applicability turn on

70. See id. at 2087 (citing the canon of constitutional avoidance to support focusing on
the argument that the implementing statute “does not cover [Bond’s] conduct”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 2098–2102 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that
Congress has power to do what is necessary and proper to facilitate the making of treaties, but
must rely on its enumerated powers to implement treaties); id. at 2103–10 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the treaty power extends only to “matters of
international intercourse and [not to] matters of purely domestic regulation”); id. at 2111
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Thomas “that the treaty power is
limited to agreements that address matters of legitimate international concern”).
72. See id. at 2093 (majority opinion).
73. See, e.g., R ESTATEMENT (F OURTH ) OF THE F OREIGN R ELATIONS L AW OF THE
UNITED STATES: T REATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM . LAW INST., Preliminary Draft
No. 4, 2015).
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whether the state law rests in an issue of traditional state responsibility
rather than on whether the state law bears on foreign affairs. The
realm of foreign affairs has expanded significantly since the treaty
power was delegated to the federal government. One need not try to
dial back to an originalist understanding of the scope of foreign affairs
to protect state interests from unintentional displacement through a
presumption focused on states’ traditional realm.
A final observation supports application of the presumption to
treaties executed by statute. Non-self-executing treaties may be
implemented “through preexisting law.” 74 Prior to negotiation of the
treaty, these “implementing” statutes would be subject to the
presumption against preemption to the same extent as other statutes
that exist independent of treaties. There is little reason to believe
that this result would change when the statutes became linked to a
non-self-executing treaty. 75 At least this subset of statutes, then,
would be governed by the presumption against preemption.
B. Self-Executing Treaties
This takes us to self-executing treaties. One unfamiliar with the
substantive scope of treaties might be forgiven for wondering whether
the presumption by its own terms would reach self-executing treaties.
As noted, the presumption in its narrow version applies only when the
state law to be preempted sits in an area of traditional state
regulation. 76 Treaties inevitably extend beyond the domestic as they
involve commitments to, and/or by, at least one foreign state or
entity. Nonetheless, treaties have addressed matters of traditional state
regulation since before the Founding. 77 Globalization and the
expansion of international law have only increased the probability that
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“There can, of course, be instances in which the
United States Constitution, or previously enacted legislation, will be fully adequate to give
effect to an apparently non-self-executing international agreement, thus obviating the need of
adopting new legislation to implement it.”).
75. If this conclusion is correct, it also undercuts the argument that the existence of an
international obligation precludes application of the presumption against preemption. See infra
paragraph accompanying note 94.
76. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 199, 220–21, 229, 241 (1796)
(concluding that the U.S.-Britain Treaty of Peace preempted a Virginia law that addressed the
obligations of debtors, a matter that fell within state power).
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treaties will address matters of traditional state regulation. 78 Like
statutes, then, treaties address subjects of traditional state authority,
and do so with increasing frequency.
As noted above, self-executing treaties also effect preemption.
The question is whether treaties should effect preemption more
readily than statutes. The source of treaties’ and statutes’ preemptive
power is the same—the Supremacy Clause. 79 That Clause does not
suggest that either treaties or statutes should have greater preemptive
effect than the other. It simply declares that statutes passed pursuant
to the Constitution and treaties made before or after ratification of
the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” 80 Consistent with this text, the Supreme Court
recognized in Foster v. Nielson that although “[a] treaty is in its nature
a contract between two nations, not a legislative act,” “[i]n the United
States a different principle is established.” 81 A treaty “is . . . to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it” is self-executing. 82 The fact that statutes and selfexecuting treaties share the same preemptive power and present the
same threat to traditional state authority suggest that they should be
equally subject to the presumption against preemption.
To apply the presumption differently to statutes and treaties
would require finding that the treaty power or its product is
meaningfully different than the legislative power or its product. 83 No
relevant differences appear.
78. See, e.g., Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2099–2100 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting the expansion of topics addressed by treaties, especially multilateral treaties, since
World War II); id. at 2110 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States’ abandonment of a subject matter limitation
on the treaty power between the second and third editions).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
80. Id.
81. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2. Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
82. Id. This equivalence is also reflected in the last-in-time rule under which a statute
or self-executing treaty trumps a prior inconsistent treaty or statute as a matter of domestic law.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
(1-2) cmts. a–c, reporters’ note 1–2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
83. Cf. Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 971–78 (arguing against applying the
presumption against preemption to self-executing treaties given the unique nature of
treaties and the treaty power).
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1. Treaty Power
Some would argue that the treaty and legislative powers are
distinguishable because the federal power to make treaties is
exclusive, while Congress’s power to legislate is generally concurrent.
Michael Van Alstine, for example, argues that “treaties by their
nature represent a formal exercise of the federal government’s
exclusive authority over the creation of international obligations of
the United States. This fundamental difference with the shared
legislative powers of Article I substantially undermines the traditional
presumption against preemption . . . in the treaty context.” 84
The difference between the treaty and legislative powers
ultimately does not support differential application of the
presumption against preemption, however. The treatymakers are as
bound by the Constitution as are federal legislators and the
presumption derives from the Constitution. More particularly, it
derives, not from the nature of any one enumerated power, but from
the Constitution’s federalist structure. 85 Even Missouri v. Holland
recognized that that structure applies to the treaty power. 86
Moreover, the legislative power and the treaty power are similar
in important respects. Both partake of a two-fold nature. In one
sense, the legislative and treaty powers are procedural. They are
vehicles for exercising lawmaking and other governmental powers. In
another sense, they are substantive. They may address a range of
substantive issues. Treatymaking as a device is denied to the states. 87
However, the delegation of the treaty procedure to the federal
government did not itself displace state substantive authority in areas
of traditional state regulation. To conclude otherwise would be to
suggest that upon delegation of the treaty power, the states were
divested of authority to address any issue that might be addressed by
a treaty. No one goes that far. And if it is true that the federal treaty
84. Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 899.
85. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089, 2091 (majority) (noting that the “[c]losely
related” “assumption that Congress normally preserves ‘the constitutional balance between the
National Government and the States’ . . . is grounded in the very structure of the
Constitution”) (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2001)).
86. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920) (assessing whether the
treaty in question was “forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment”).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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power alone does not displace all traditional state authority that
might be displaced by an actual treaty, then the rationale behind the
presumption applies. The presumption rests on the rationale that
even where the federal government has the power to address issues
of traditional state regulation, state power should not be displaced
without clear federal intent to do so. That is, the presumption turns
on the substantive power of the states, not the vehicles retained by
the states to exercise that power. The logic of the presumption thus
supports its application to both statutes and their domestic law
equivalent, self-executing treaties.
The fact that the treaty power might be broader, as a
substantive matter, than the legislative power granted to Congress
does not alter this conclusion. When Congress enacts a statute it
invariably exercises only some of the legislative power it possesses.
Congress’s additional legislative power remains dormant as to the
specific piece of legislation. The fact that Congress has been given
additional legislative power does not mean that the enacted statute
produces a broader preemptive effect than compelled by the
enacted legislation. Similarly, the fact that the federal government
may have a subject-matter-unlimited treaty power does not mean
that the treaty actually approved should have broader preemptive
effect than the treatymakers intended. Indeed, the fact that the
federal government possesses unexercised treaty or legislative power
after having enacted a statute or entered a treaty suggests that a
presumption against preemption ought to apply. Such a
presumption ensures that preemption only follows from federal
navigation of the state-protective procedures required to exercise
the statute and treatymaking powers rather than from an
unintended dormant preemption. 88

88. See Michael D. Ramsey, Congress’s Limited Power to Enforce Treaties, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1539, 1551 (2015) (arguing that “ambiguous treaty provisions should be
construed not to invade traditional powers of the states” to ensure that such invasions only
occur with supermajority Senate approval); Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089 (explaining that “when
legislation ‘affect[s] the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in
the judicial decision’”) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971)); Curtis A.
Bradley, Bond, Clear Statement Requirements, and Political Process, AJIL UNBOUND (Jun. 3,
2014), https://www.asil.org/blogs/bond-clear-statement-requirements-and-political-process
(“[R]equiring that Congress expressly consider whether to intrude on state authority, rather
than having the courts infer such intrusions, helps ensure that advocates of state authority will

1571

4.MOORE.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/30/2016 6:02 PM

2015

It also ensures that the treaty power does not become a oneway ratchet to erode state authority. 89 Delegation of treatymaking
power to the national government was intended to check the states
from acting contrary to treaty commitments, not to eliminate the
states. 90 The treatymakers have exercised the treaty power in ways
consistent with that understanding. They have routinely respected
federalist values in treatymaking. 91 Federalism restraints on the
treaty power do not solely serve state interests, however. As the
Court repeated in Bond, the division of authority between the
federal and state governments protects individual liberty. 92
Treatymakers should be presumed not to have intended to erode
those liberty protections unless they do so clearly and, therefore,
accountably. Finally, the presumption against preemption serves to
moderate the debate over the scope of the treaty power. 93 It need
not foreclose the conclusion that the treaty power is subjectmatter-unlimited even as it protects state interests against
unintended preemption pursuant to that power.

be able to express their opposition adequately during the legislative process.”); Dodge,
supra note 61 (noting that “the [Bond] Court’s approach has the salutary effect of
protecting the political process or, as the Court put it in Bond, assuring ‘that the legislature
has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved’”) (quoting
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089).
89. Cf. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(expressing doubt that the treaty power is a vehicle for establishing a federal police power
over domestic affairs).
90. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
39–40 (2007).
91. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist
Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1369–86 (2006) (discussing five
ways in which the executive has accommodated federalism in treatymaking: “rejecting the
treaty, . . . modifying the treaty, . . . modifying U.S. consent to the treaty, . . . limiting federal
implementation of the treaty, and . . . limiting federal enforcement of the treaty”).
92. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091; id. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 2103 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. For a sense of the debate regarding the scope of the treaty power, compare Curtis
A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998), and
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98
(2000), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000), and Edward T.
Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003).
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2. Treaty Product
As with differences between the treaty and legislative powers,
differences in the products of those powers—treaties and statutes—
fail to justify differential application of the presumption against
preemption. The treaty power produces a product—the treaty—that
differs from a statute in that the treaty involves an international law
commitment to at least one other country or international entity.
Care must be taken not to overstate the difference, however, because
the process for creating statutes is widely employed to enter
international agreements and because statutes can affect foreign
affairs just as treaties can. 94 But perhaps the fact that treaties embrace
an international obligation should lead to greater enforcement of
treaties against the states. 95 Tellingly, the treaty’s international role
has not produced this result in the self-execution context. As noted,
in Medellín the Court adopted a broad notion of non-self-execution,
leading to less judicial enforcement of treaties than statutes,
notwithstanding treaties’ dual nature. 96 The decision suggests that
the dual nature of treaties does not require that treaties receive
greater application than statutes.
One might argue that because non-self-execution already reduces
treaty enforcement, there is no need for an additional presumption
against preemption. Yet the two doctrines serve different primary
functions. Non-self-execution primarily plays a horizontal role,
influencing whether treaties’ domestic impact will be decided by the
courts or Congress following ratification. 97 The presumption against
preemption, by contrast, primarily addresses the vertical distribution
of authority between the federal government and the states,
protecting states against unintentional displacement in areas of
traditional state power.

94. See, e.g., David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?:
Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2250–53 (2010).
95. See Van Alstine, supra note 2, at 971–73.
96. See supra text accompanying note 56.
97. Indeed, in a forthcoming book, David Sloss argues that the notion that a non-selfexecuting treaty does not preempt state law is a post-World War II departure from the
traditional understanding of the Supremacy Clause. See DAVID SLOSS, INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION: THE SILENT DEATH OF THE CONSTITUTION’S TREATY
SUPREMACY RULE (forthcoming) (copy on file with author).
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This vertical role has become more relevant as treaties address an
expanding range of subject matters. In this sense, application of the
presumption against preemption to self-executing treaties parallels
application of the presumption to statutes. The expansion of the
federal government’s legislative power, largely through the
Commerce Clause, generated a need for the presumption against
preemption as a means of protecting against the concentration of
power. 98 So, too, in the treaty context, the use of treaties to address a
widening range of issues generates greater demand for the
presumption against preemption.
Trends in related areas support this conclusion. Even as
international law and foreign affairs have expanded into areas of
traditional state concern, the Supreme Court has shown greater
solicitude for state sovereignty in the field of dormant preemption. 99
Although the Court had previously engaged in dormant foreign
commerce preemption, 100 in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board of California the Court refused to preempt California’s
approach to the taxation of multilateral corporations, leaving it to
Congress to decide whether the California law should be tolerated. 101
Even more pertinent, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,
the Court suggested that dormant foreign affairs preemption (à la
Zschernig 102) might only be appropriate when a state acts outside an
area of traditional state regulation. 103
Where, however, a State has acted within . . . its ‘traditional
competence,’ but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might
make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality

98. See Young, supra note 1, at 267–68, 320–21.
99. See, e.g., David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1012–13 &
n.301 (2014) (discussing the trend toward greater respect for state sovereignty in preemption
cases as well as hiccups in that trend).
100. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453–54
(1979) (sustaining, on dormant foreign commerce grounds, an as applied challenge to a
California tax).
101. See 512 U.S. 298, 327–38 (1994).
102. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (engaging in dormant foreign
affairs preemption of an Oregon inheritance statute).
103. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 & n.11 (2003).
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that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of
the state concern asserted. 104

In raising this proposition, the Court cited the same case it did in
Bond for the presumption against preemption: Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corporation. 105 The trend toward sensitivity to traditional
state authority in the dormant context strengthens the case for that
same sensitivity in the treaty preemption context.
Bond both supports this conclusion and casts some doubt on it,
but that doubt is not unavoidable. Bond stated in dictum that the
federalism canon for interpreting the reach of implementing statutes
does not apply to treaties. That is, implementing statutes, unlike
treaties, “must be read consistent with principles of federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure.” 106 Yet it appears this

104. Id. at 419 n.11; see also id. at 420 (suggesting that from the conflict preemption
perspective, “it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by
standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before
declaring the state law preempted”). Not only has the Court been more sensitive to the states
in dormant preemption, but it has recently recognized boundaries on executive preemption of
state law as well. See supra text accompanying notes 45–53.
105. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088–89; Garamendi, 539 U.S.
at 419 n.11.
106. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. The Court made a similar statement a few months earlier
in Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014). Lozano concerned the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing
statute. See id. at 1228–29. The Convention generally mandates the return of an abducted
child if the “petition for return [is filed] within one year after the child’s wrongful removal.”
Id. at 1229. The Court addressed whether this “1-year period is subject to equitable tolling,”
as federal statutes of limitations are presumed to be. Id. at 1231; see id. at 1231–32. In the
course of concluding that equitable tolling did not apply, the Court stated that “[e]ven if a
background principle is relevant to the interpretation of federal statutes, it has no proper role
in the interpretation of treaties unless that principle is shared by the parties to ‘an agreement
among sovereign powers.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S.
217, 226 (1996)). This statement does not bear on the presumption against preemption,
however. The presumption against preemption addresses how a treaty obligation will be
implemented domestically. Unless the states parties address that question, it is governed by the
U.S. treatymakers’ intent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“In the absence of special
agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to decide how it will carry out its international
obligations.”). The Court rejected the use of domestic background principles to resolve
questions of the states parties’ intent. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1232–33 (emphasizing that the
parties’ intent governs the interpretation of treaty obligations). The states that enter a treaty
cannot be assumed to act against the same legal backdrop that applies to domestic lawmaking.
Thus, for example, Congress “legislate[s] against a background of common law adjudicatory
principles,” including the principle of equitable tolling, in a way that states parties negotiating
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statement was informed by the dual international and domestic
nature of treaties. Treaties create obligations under international law
and, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, may also be judicially
enforceable domestic law. 107 Unless the parties to a treaty addressed
the question of preemption, the issue of preemption would not arise
in interpreting the international obligations imposed by the treaty.
Consequently, the presumption against preemption would not be
relevant in ascertaining the international meaning of the treaty. The
presumption would, however, remain relevant in understanding how
the treaty would be enforced as a matter of domestic law. This
interpretation of the Court’s dictum is consistent with the fact that
the Chemical Weapons Convention was non-self-executing and
therefore would have primarily had an international law effect absent
implementation by Congress. It would not have been subject to
judicial enforcement as domestic law.
The draft Restatement (Fourth) pursues treaty interpretation
concerns further in noting that “[a] presumption against preemption
of State law could create an interpretation of the treaty that is
different from the one shared by other parties to the treaty.” 108 U.S.
treaty jurisprudence already assumes this risk in departing from the
interpretive rules of international law 109 by, inter alia, endorsing

treaties naturally do not. Id. at 1232 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)). The Court’s statement in Lozano was thus correct, but should not
be taken out of context to reach background principles, like the presumption against
preemption, that attach to domestic questions of U.S. treatymaker intent.
107. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 91, at 1327–28 (discussing treaties’ “double life”).
108. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
109. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties detail the
international law of treaty interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–
32, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, but has stated that many of its provisions, including Articles 31 and
32, reflect customary international law that binds the United States. See, e.g., Obligations of
Signatories Prior to Ratification, 2001 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 4, § B(1) at 212 (noting that “the United States regards [the
Vienna Convention] as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); Conclusion
and Entry into Force, 1979 DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW at 692 (quoting the U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Convention as stating that
“[t]he Vienna Convention provisions . . . are for the most part codifications of customary
international law”). Jean Galbraith argues that the international and U.S. approaches to treaty
interpretation have converged since the Restatement (Third), but partly because international
practice has embraced a wider range of interpretive approaches than Article 31 and 32
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more immediate recourse to negotiation history and giving weight
to the executive’s interpretation of a treaty. 110 Further, while it is
perhaps not as rare for states parties to consider federalist hurdles to
treaty obligations than to consider the question of self-execution,
still it seems that states parties will generally not consider, let alone
reach, an understanding on the preemptive force of treaties. 111 To the
extent they invest negotiating time and energy into reaching such an
understanding, it presumably will be reflected in the treaty such that
the presumption will be overcome. If any shared interpretation is
ambiguous, the presumption secures a significant benefit—checking
centralization of power—at a small cost to the treatymakers—the
burden of being clearer.
On a related note, the Draft posits that a presumption against
preemption may “make it difficult for the United States to secure
domestic compliance with a treaty, which can create foreign-relations
difficulties for the United States.” 112 The Restatement (Third) made
this same argument in supporting a presumption in favor of selfexecution. 113 That argument did not outweigh structural
constitutional concerns in Medellín. Moreover, the treatymakers
themselves apparently see certain foreign relations costs as
worthwhile when they reject or negotiate alterations in treaties or
attach reservations, understandings, or declarations to U.S. treaty
ratification to accommodate federalism concerns. 114 Further, to the
extent there is anything to the argument that foreign states can

originally suggested. See Jean Galbraith, What Should RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) Say About
Treaty Interpretation?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1499, 1511–18 (2016). Even if there has been
convergence, differences remain.
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 325 cmt. g., reporters’ notes 1, 4, 5; § 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
111. The treaty in Bond, for example, was “agnostic between enforcement at the state
versus federal level.” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087. See generally Hollis, supra note 91, at 1374–78
(discussing ways in which the executive has sought to alter the text or understanding of treaties
during negotiation to avoid federalism problems).
112. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
114. See Hollis, supra note 91, at 1372–81 (discussing U.S. rejection, alteration, and
ratification of treaties in ways sensitive to federalism interests).
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target offending states rather than the nation as a whole, the
argument would have traction here as well. 115
Finally, the Draft suggests that applying the presumption may be
unnecessary because the Article II treatymaking process “was
designed to protect State interests” and in fact does so, as reflected
in the federalism interests that make it into “reservations,
understandings, or declarations during the ratification process.” 116
This is an argument against the presumption against preemption
generally. The legislative process was also designed to protect state
interests 117 and does so—for example, by producing statutes that
expressly preserve state law. 118 Yet the presumption against
preemption applies to legislation. In accepting constitutional
procedure as the primary protection for state interests, the Court did
not eliminate a judicial role in the preservation of federalism. 119 The
Court has supplemented with canons such as the presumption
against preemption that ensure that preemption results from the
constitutional process. 120 The previously noted concern of the
treatymakers for federalist interests means that two constitutional

115. See Moore, supra note 99, at 1019 & n.335 (noting this argument as well as the
response of its skeptics).
116. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 108 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
117. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985).
118. Id. at 553–54.
119. See Young, supra note 1, at 262, 264 (asserting that Garcia was not “an abdication
of any judicial enforcement of limits on national power” but “a shift from efforts to impose
substantive limitations on national power to a focus on process”). Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 938 (4th ed. 2007) (suggesting that the federalism-based clear statement rule
from Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), might be justified “on the ground that the
Tenth Amendment was underenforced by the Supreme Court, which had rarely invalidated
federal laws because they intruded into core state functions”).
120. See, e.g., Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088–90; Young, supra note 1, at 256, 265–69, 321–
23 (emphasizing “the critical importance of the ‘presumption against preemption’” where “the
courts’ [current] role in protecting federalism . . . focus[es] on facilitating and enhancing the
operation of the[] political and procedural checks on national authority”). On occasion, the
Court has also recognized substantive limits on congressional powers. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–91 (2012); id. at 2642–50 (joint dissent); id.
at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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actors view federalism interests as significant in treatymaking. 121 The
presumption against preemption serves those interests.
CONCLUSION
While the draft Restatement (Fourth) suggests that the role of
the presumption against preemption is unclear in treaty preemption,
recent developments suggest that there is or should be greater
clarity. In particular, Medellín indicates that the presumption does
not apply to non-self-executing treaties—not because treaties
preempt more readily than statutes, but because non-self-executing
treaties cannot preempt state law at all. Bond provides support for
the conclusion that the presumption applies to executed treaties.
And there are significant arguments that the presumption should
apply to self-executing treaties as well. As a result, the Restatement
(Fourth) need not be so reluctant to embrace the presumption
against preemption in the treaty context.

121. See Hollis, supra note 91, at 1386, 1392–93 (noting how the executive’s treatment
of federalism in treatymaking “offers evidence of treaty power limits from the power-holder’s
perspective—limits to which the Court is likely to defer”).
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